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I. INTRODUCTION
WHEN CONGRESS PASSED THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT of 1984' amending the Fed-
eral, Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938,2 it did so to speed the development and
marketing of generic drugs? Congress hoped that increased competition from ge-
neric drugs would reduce prices for consumers. Congress streamlined the FDA ap-
proval process for generic drugs and created incentives for generics to challenge
patents held by manufacturers of "pioneer" drugs.'
However, Hatch-Waxman's remedy may prove worse than the "disease" it alleg-
edly treats. One unforeseen consequence of Hatch-Waxman's generic drug approval
regime is visible in the settlements of patent infringement suits encouraged by the
law's incentives. Hatch-Waxman reduced the financial risk involved for generic
drug manufacturers in their attacks on patented "pioneer" drugs. As a result, pat-
ented drug manufacturers have been more willing to settle patent infringement
suits against their generic challengers, even on terms that appear favorable to the
generic manufacturer. An increasingly common term of these patent-generic settle-
ments has been so-called "reverse payments" made by the patent holder to the
generic manufacturer. Even more troubling to some critics are so-called "pay for
delay" settlements, in which the reverse payments are accompanied by the generic's
agreement to postpone entry into the market.
Such settlements have been increasingly challenged in both private and federal
antitrust actions as unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.5 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in particular, has taken a
strong stance against settlements involving reverse payments and other allegedly
J I.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 2008; M.A., University of Pennsylvania; A.B., Dartmouth
College.
1. Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
2. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2000)).
3. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 308 (2004).
4. Id.
5. Anne-Marie C. Yvon, Settlements Between Brand and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: A Reasonable
Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payments, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1892 n.19 (2006).
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anticompetitive terms. Three appellate courts also have ruled on the validity of
these settlements, with the Second, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits proposing compet-
ing standards by which to evaluate them.6 Nor has the FTC's approach been cham-
pioned by the Department of Justice (DOJ).7 In fact, the Solicitor General's office
has written amicus briefs at the request of the Supreme Court that successfully
argued against the Supreme Court hearing the FTC's appeal. Finally, even Congress
has considered legislation to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to prohibit such re-
verse payments! For the moment, the Supreme Court has refused to grant certio-
rari to address this issue, most recently denying the FTC's petition for certiorari'
from the Second Circuit's decision in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.l°
As an initial matter, Congress should not step in to resolve this situation. As has
been the case with antitrust doctrine in general, the solution to this problem
should come from the courts. Indeed, the best standard for the courts to adopt is a
modification of the one proposed by the Eleventh Circuit." Courts should evaluate
the allegedly anticompetitive aspects of patent settlements under a two-step stan-
dard: (1) a comparison of the exclusionary scope of the patent and the settlement
terms; and (2) a traditional rule of reason treatment that would take into account
the first step's findings. Only such a two-step standard recognizes the value of both
the patent and antitrust regimes' complementary approaches to promoting
competition.
Part II of this Comment outlines the regulatory framework for FDA approval
under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and presents the features of common set-
tlements that raise antitrust concerns. 12 Part III of this Comment briefly sketches
the applicable federal antitrust standards and describes the tension among the pat-
ent and antitrust regimes. 3 Part IV presents the principal cases to have reached the
appellate courts and the various standards articulated by these courts, the FTC and
recent Congressional bills. 4 Part V analyzes the merits of these proposed solutions
and argues for the adoption of a modified two-step version of the Eleventh Circuit's
standard."s
6. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub horn., Joblove v.
Barr Labs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub
nom., Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344
F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae at the Request of the Court, FTC v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2006 WL 1358441.
8. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007).
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tamoxifen, 127 S. Ct. 3001 (No. 06-830), 2006 WL 3694387.
10. Tarnoxifen, 466 F.3d 187.
11. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066.
12. See infra Part 11.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
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II. HATCH-WAXMAN'S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act Introduces the Abbreviated New Drug Application
The principal goal of Hatch-Waxman was to speed the arrival of generic drugs onto
the market in order to increase competition and thereby reduce costs to consum-
ers. 6 To accomplish this goal, the Act streamlined the FDA approval process for
generic drug manufacturers by developing the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA). 7 To qualify for this more efficient approval regime, the proposed generic
must be "bioequivalent" to the previously approved patented drug. 8 Rather than
having to implement and submit costly and time-consuming "safety and efficacy
studies,"' 9 a generic manufacturer filing an ANDA may rely on the studies previ-
ously filed by the patent manufacturer and already approved by the FDA.2" This
reduces costs and time investment on the part of the generic drug manufacturers.
The ANDA filer must also submit a certification that "the proposed generic drug
does not infringe any patent listed with the FDA as covering the pioneer drug."2'
There are four forms this certification may take,22 but the so-called "Paragraph IV"
certification is the only one relevant in the context of the patent settlements. In a
Paragraph IV certification, the ANDA filer certifies that the "patent [for which its
generic is bioequivalent] is invalid or [would] not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the new drug." "2
The ANDA filer's election of Paragraph IV certification triggers a crucial series of
statutory requirements. First, the ANDA filer must give notice to each and every
patent holder affected by the certification.24 Second, upon receipt of this notice, the
patent holder has forty-five days to initiate a patent infringement lawsuit against
the generic manufacturer.2" Should the patent holder decide not to file a lawsuit,
the FDA "may immediately approve the ANDA" and the generic subsequently can
enter the market.26
16. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
308 (2004).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). All drugs must be approved by the FDA. Id. § 355(a). Prior to the 1984
Hatch Waxman Act (HWA), there was one method, new drug approval (NDA), for getting FDA approval. Id.
§ 355(b). The HWA adds the ANDA in § 355(j).
18. Id. § 355(j)(1), (2)(A), (7)(A); see In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 191 (2d
Cir. 2006), cert denied sub nom., Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007).
19. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2003), cert denied sub nom., Andrx
Pharms., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
21. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 901.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). The certification may also state that: (1) there was no patent filed for the
"listed" drug (a "paragraph I" certification); (2) that the patent has expired (a "paragraph II" certification); or
(3) the patent will expire on a specific date, and the generic drug will not be marketed before that time (a
"paragraph IllI" certification). Id.
23. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vi)(IV).
24. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
25. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
26. Id.
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If, however, the patent holder elects to file an infringement suit within the forty-
five day window, a thirty-month stay goes into effect and prohibits the FDA from
approving the ANDA filing within that time. 7 The only way that this stay can be
lifted prematurely is if a district court concludes-in a final decision-that the
patent has not been infringed or is otherwise invalid. Following such a ruling, the
FDA may begin approving ANDA filings as of the date of the court's decision.2"
While the thirty-month stay offers patent holders significant protection, ANDA
procedures also provide incentives to generic manufacturers. The first ANDA filer
receives a 180-day exclusivity period in exchange for taking on the prospective risks
of defending a patent infringement suit. 9 During this exclusivity period, the FDA is
prohibited from approving any other generic manufacturer's ANDA until 180 days
after the earlier of two events: (1) the date of the first ANDA filer's commercial
marketing of its generic drug; or (2) the date of a "court [decision ruling] that the
patent is invalid or not infringed.""° This exclusivity period was designed to en-
courage ANDA filings in the face of a strong disincentive: the first ANDA filer takes
the financial burden and risk of defending a potential infringement suit brought by
the patent holder. Should the first ANDA filer prevail in the patent infringement
suit, a subsequent ANDA filer could otherwise immediately enter the market and
"free ride" on the first filer's efforts.
It is important to point out one other aspect of the Paragraph IV certification
that is no longer in effect, but has some bearing on the factual circumstances of the
appellate cases discussed below." FDA regulations had required, prior to 1998, that
ANDA filers would not get the 180-day exclusivity period unless they had success-
fully defended the patent infringement suit. 2 This "successful defense" interpreta-
tion was found to be unreasonable,33 and the FDA dropped this requirement in
November 1998." 4 The newer interpretation removes any such obstacle to the first
ANDA filer receiving the 180-day exclusivity period.
B. Typical Patent Settlements under Hatch-Waxman
Hatch-Waxman's goal of increasing challenges of weak patents in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry has been only partially successful. Paragraph IV certifications have in-
27. Id.
28. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(l).
29. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
30. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). Pre-2000, this was calculated from a "final judgment from which no appeal
can be or has been taken." 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(e)(1) (1999). Now, a district court decision is sufficient. Mylan
Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
31. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 308 (2004).
32. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338,
367 (Oct. 3, 1994) (adopting successful defense regulation as a final rule, codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.107).
33. Mova Pharms. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069-70 (D.D.C. 1998).
34. Effective Date of Approval of an Abbreviated New Drug Application, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,710, 711 (Nov. 5,
1998) (interim rule).
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creased, but so too have settlements of the resulting infringement actions on terms
that delay generic entry into the market.35 Outside of the Hatch-Waxman regula-
tory framework, patent settlements often involve the purchase of a license from the
patent holder by the generic manufacturer. Such settlements not only reward the
patent holder for its innovation, but also increase competition in the marketplace.
Under Hatch-Waxman, however, the regulatory framework has created incentives
that lead to settlements with the exact opposite results. These settlements have in-
creasingly included so-called "reverse" payments-from the patent holder to the
generic manufacturer-and agreements by the generic not to enter the market for a
specific period of time.36 These are sometimes referred to as "pay for delay" settle-
ments. For the consumer, there is no competition to reduce the price of the pioneer
drug.
These settlements often are accompanied by other terms as well. For example,
the patent holder may agree to purchase licenses on other products owned by the
generic manufacturer. Additionally, the underlying patent settlement may-but is
not always-dismissed or otherwise resolved. Finally, a bottleneck can be created
which prevents subsequent ANDA filers from entering the market.
This last term particularly has troubled antitrust regulators and consumer advo-
cates. Under normal ANDA procedures, the patent holder will continue to enjoy a
monopoly until the approved date on which the generic manufacturer can enter the
market. For the next 180 days, the two companies will enjoy duopoly control of the
market. Finally, full competition occurs after the expiration of the 180-day exclu-
sivity period, when other generics enter the market. Remember, however, that the
exclusivity period is only triggered by one of two events. The settlement is designed
such that the 180-day exclusivity period never will be triggered when (1) the ge-
neric manufacturer agrees not to enter the market, and (2) it precludes a court
decision in the underlying infringement suit. Thus, the "bottleneck" results, because
no other generic can enter the market. Consumer advocates and the FTC argue that
such terms harm consumers who would have enjoyed fuller competition and lower
prices absent these agreements.
III. THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL ANTITRUST STANDARDS AND THE
TENSION BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST REGIMES
A. Federal Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Restraints of Trade
Patent settlements between generic and drug manufacturers typically have been
challenged under the Sherman Act, section 1 of which prohibits agreements in
35. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003
2 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/20O6/O4/fy2O5drugsetlementsrpt.pdf.
36. id.
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restraint of trade." It is well-settled that the intent behind this sweeping prohibi-
tion is to condemn only unreasonable restraints of trade.3" The FTC may also chal-
lenge violations of the Sherman Act under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.39
Courts evaluate restraints of trade using three different standards. Under the first
type of analysis, practices that are clearly anticompetitive are declared "per se ille-
gal."40 Practices such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation are so obvi-
ously anticompetitive that judicial economy precludes an investigation into any
alleged pro-competitive effects or justifications.' In per se treatment, plaintiffs
need only show that the restraint occurred, but are not required to demonstrate
actual anti-competitive effects in the market.42 The defendant is barred from offer-
ing justifications or demonstrating that actual market effects were pro-competi-
tive.43 Courts have been reluctant to add to the category of restraints that are
deemed per se illegal, limiting this analysis to practices with which the judiciary has
long-term experience of the anticompetitive effects.44
Under the second analysis, the "rule of reason" treatment, courts "tak[e] into
account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant busi-
ness, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's
history, nature, and effect."4" The framework for this analysis involves a burden-
shifting, three-step process.46 First, the plaintiff has the initial burden to show that
the challenged conduct produces anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.4 If
the plaintiff is successful, the second step requires the defendant to demonstrate
sufficient pro-competitive justifications.4" In the third step, the burden returns to
the plaintiff to show that the defendant could have accomplished these goals in a
less restrictive manner.49
Finally, a third type of analysis has evolved: the "quick look" or "truncated rule of
reason" treatment.50 The truncated rule of reason analysis permits the plaintiff to
shift the burden more quickly to the defendant, once the plaintiff has shown that
the defendant has engaged in conduct similar to those practices falling into the per
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2002) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
38. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
342-43 (1982).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
40. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
41. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10.
42. 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 5.7 (2007).
43. id.
44. Id.
45. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10.
46. HOLMES, supra note 42, § 5.5.
47. Id.
48. id.
49. Id.
50. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
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se category, e.g., restraints on price, output or customers." The plaintiff need not
establish the relevant market nor the defendant's market power, but the defendant
has the opportunity to demonstrate procompetitive justifications and efficiencies. 2
Modern antitrust doctrine has tended to view these three analytical approaches as
relative points on a spectrum, rather than discrete categories.
B. The Conflicting Regimes of the Patent and Antitrust Laws
Like the antitrust laws, the patent laws also seek to improve the fate of the con-
sumer in the marketplace, but do so in an opposite manner. While the antitrust
laws prohibit restraints of trade in order to increase competition, the patent laws
restrict competition in order to encourage innovation. 3 For this reason, intersec-
tions of patent and antitrust law have been marked by the need for careful, deliber-
ate analysis by the courts.5 4
A patent grants the patent holder "the lawful right to exclude others." 5 There are
some limits to this exclusionary right, but this right permits the patent holder to do
two things: (1) the patent holder can elect not to produce the patented article and
thus exclude its use completely;56 or (2) the patent holder can elect to "be the sole
supplier itself."5" Crucially, the patent right permits the patent holder to act in ways
that otherwise would violate the antitrust laws: (1) the patent holder can divide up
the geographical market by granting exclusive territorial licenses;" or (2) allocate
the market in other ways, such as between retailers and wholesalers. 9 Antitrust
doctrine must acknowledge these conflicting circumstances whenever evaluating a
patent holder's conduct.
IV. DIVERGENT STANDARDS FOR THE TREATMENT OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT SETTLEMENTS
Settlements under Hatch-Waxman generally did not involve "reverse payments" un-
til the mid-1990's.6" As the number of agreements with such payments increased,6'
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW I 20.08b
(2003).
54. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMp, ANTITRUST LAW 5 704-05 (2d ed. 2002).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (defining infringement); Id. § 283 (providing injunctive relief for infringe-
ment); see also Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 125
S. Ct. 308 (2004),
56. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1305.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Exclusion Payments to Settle Pharmaceutical Patent
Cases: They're B-a-a-a-ck!, Address at the Second Annual In-House Counsel's Forum on Pharmaceutical Anti-
trust 8 (Apr. 24, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/O60424PharmaSpeechACI.pdf.
61. Id.
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the FTC began challenging them and obtained a number of consent orders.62 Even-
tually some cases began to reach the federal district courts, 3 but the issue did not
reach a federal appellate court until 2003 when the Sixth Circuit decided In Re
Cardizern CD Antitrust Litigation." In three subsequent cases, both the Eleventh
and the Second Circuits also have addressed pharmaceutical patent settlements
under Hatch-Waxman.65 An examination of the conflicting standards articulated by
the courts reveals the difficulty in balancing the competing values of patent and
antitrust law, while also respecting the Hatch-Waxman regulatory framework. Fi-
nally, a legislative solution to these issues was offered in Senate Bill 316, the Pre-
serve Access to Affordable Generics Act of 2007.66
A. The Sixth Circuit Cardizem Decision: Agreements Involving "Pay for Delay"
are Per Se Illegal
In Cardizem,67 a Sixth Circuit panel found an agreement between patent holder,
Hochst Marion Roussel (HMR), and generic manufacturer, Andrx, Inc. (Andrx),
per se illegal as a "naked, horizontal restraint of trade." 6 A brief review of the
underlying facts demonstrates how the Hatch-Waxman framework plays out in ac-
tual infringement suits and settlements. HMR manufactured and sold a drug,
Cardizem CD, that prevented heart attacks and strokes. 69 HMR's original patent for
dilitazem chloride, the active ingredient of Cardizem CD, expired in late 1992.70 In
September 1995, Andrx filed an ANDA with the FDA and submitted a Paragraph
IV certification, averring that its drug did not infringe on HMR's patent.7 As the
first ANDA filer to do so, Andrx earned the right to a 180-day exclusivity period.72
In November 1995, HMR received a new patent for Cardizem CD's "dissolution
profile" ("the '584 patent").73 HMR subsequently filed a patent infringement suit in
January 1996."4 This triggered the thirty-month stay, prohibiting Andrx from mar-
keting its generic competitor and prohibiting the FDA from approving a second
ANDA filer.75 The thirty-month stay did not, however, prevent the FDA from ten-
tatively approving Andrx's ANDA, subject to the resolution of the infringement
suit.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
65. See supra note 6.
66. See supra note 8.
67. 332 F.3d 896.
68. Id. at 905.
69. Id. at 901.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 902.
72. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 355(j) (Supp. V 2006).
73. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
74. Id.
75. id.
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Shortly after the FDA granted this tentative approval, the two companies entered
into the agreement that is the subject of the case.76 There are four principal terms
of the agreement relevant to our analysis. First, the agreement did not settle the
patent infringement suit.77 Second, HMR agreed to pay Andrx $40 million per year
in quarterly payments, beginning at the moment of FDA approval of Andrx's
ANDA, which would occur only upon expiration of the thirty-month stay.7" Third,
Andrx agreed to delay marketing any generic version of cardizem in the United
States.79 Fourth, Andrx agreed not to "relinquish or otherwise compromise any
right accruing" under its ANDA filing, including the 180-day exclusivity period."0
The result of these terms was that Andrx received approximately $40 million per
year, and HMR continued to enjoy a monopoly in the cardizem market.
On July 9, 1998, one day after the thirty-month stay ended, the FDA approved
Andrx's ANDA, and HMR began making its quarterly payments." For eleven
months, HMR continued its quarterly payments, and Andrx did not market its
generic, despite FDA approval.8 2 Only in June 1999, after the FDA approved a refor-
mulated generic version submitted by Andrx, did the two companies terminate
their agreement and enter into a final settlement of the patent infringement suit. 3
Per this settlement, HMR made a further $50.7 million payment to Andrx, which
brought the total payments to more than $89 million. 4 On June 23, 1999, Andrx
began marketing its generic product, triggering its 180-day exclusivity period. 5
Only in December 1999-more than four years after Andrx's ANDA and more
than eighteen months after the stay ended-were subsequent ANDA filers able to
enter the market.8 6
In finding the agreement per se illegal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed both the hold-
ing and the reasoning of the district court with relatively little analysis.8 7 In its
opinion, the panel emphasized the reciprocal nature of two factors: first, HMR
agreed to pay $40 million per year to its only potential competitor to stay out of the
cardizem market.8" Second, the court noted that, because Andrx's entry into the
market was delayed, all other competitors were delayed due to the fact that Andrx
76. Id.
77. 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
78. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
79. Id. ("[Ulntil the earliest of: (1) Andrx obtaining a favorable, final and unappealable determination in
the patent infringement case; (2) HMR and Andrx entering into a license agreement; or (3) HMR entering into
a license agreement with a third party.").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 903.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 906.
87. Id. at 908.
88. Id. at 907.
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retained its 180-day exclusivity period. 9 The court was not persuaded by the de-
fendants' arguments that the agreement was an "attempt to enforce patent rights or
an interim settlement of the patent litigation"9 because it involved an agreement by
the generic manufacturer not to enter the market despite FDA approval, in ex-
change for quarterly payments.9" Such pay for delay settlements are now per se
illegal in the Sixth Circuit.
B. The Eleventh Circuit Declines to Adopt a Per Se Approach
1. Valley Drug Decision: Only Agreements that Exceed the Scope of the Patent are
Subject to Antitrust Scrutiny
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.92
was handed down only three months after Cardizem, but arrived at a starkly differ-
ent conclusion.93 As in Cardizem, the case came to the appellate court on interlocu-
tory appeal of the district court's decision finding the agreements per se illegal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Valley Drug, however, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court, emphasizing the patent holder's lawful right to enforce a
monopoly and to exclude competitors from the market.94
The facts of this case generally are similar to those of Cardizem, but there are a
couple of complications worth mentioning. Abbott Laboratories had multiple pat-
ents relating to terasozin hydrochloride, the active ingredient in a hypertension
drug marketed by Abbott since 1987."5 The patents covered various forms of the
terasozin hydrochloride compound and numerous methods for using it, including
tablet and capsule forms.96 Here, the patents were challenged by two generic com-
petitors, Geneva Pharmaceuticals and Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals.9 7 Ulti-
mately, Abbott filed suits alleging infringement of its Patent No. 5,504,207 ("the
'207 patent") against both generics.
Faced with multiple challenges to its terasozin patents, Abbott entered into an
agreement with Zenith on March 31, 1998 and with Geneva one day later. 98 The
Zenith Agreement contained four principal terms: (1) Abbott agreed to make quar-
terly payments of $6 million dollars to Zenith until March 1, 2000 or the termina-
tion of the agreement; (2) both parties dropped their lawsuit claims; (3) Zenith
89. Id.
90. Id. at 908.
91, Id. at 907-08,
92. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
93. Id. at 1312.
94. Id. at 1309 ("If this case merely involved one firm making monthly payments to potential competitors
in return for their exiting or refraining from entering the market, we would readily affirm the district court's
order. This is not such a case, however, because one of the parties owned a patent.").
95. Id. at 1298.
96. id.
97. Id. at 1296.
98. Id. at 1300.
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agreed not to market any product containing terasozin hydrochloride until Abbott's
'207 patent expired on February 17, 2000; and (4) Zenith agreed not to transfer any
of its ANDA rights, including the 180-day exclusivity period it earned as the first
ANDA filer.99
The agreement with Geneva was similar: (1) Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5
million per month, until another manufacturer brought a terasozin product to
market, or Abbott won the '207 patent infringement suit; (2) Geneva agreed not to
market any terasozin product until a second patent expired in February 2000 or
until it obtained a victorious final judgment in the '207 patent infringement suit;
(3) Geneva agreed not to transfer its rights under the ANDA, including its 180-day
exclusivity period; and (4) Geneva agreed to challenge any subsequent ANDA filer's
attempt to enforce the "successful defense" requirement.' °
The Eleventh Circuit found for the defendants and proposed a new standard to
use in evaluating Hatch-Waxman patent settlements. The court emphasized that
the "exclusionary potential of the ['207] patent" shielded the agreements' effects
from per se antitrust evaluation.' Because the '207 patent would not expire until
2014,102 the effect of the agreements on competition was "no broader than the po-
tential exclusionary effect of the '207 patent, and was actually narrower to the ex-
tent [they] permitted Zenith [and Geneva] to market [their] drug[s] before the
'207 patent expired."0 3 Even though the '207 patent subsequently was deemed inva-
lid, 10 4 the court emphasized that the reasonableness of the agreements must be con-
sidered at the time they were entered into.'00
While the court noted that the agreement resembled a horizontal market alloca-
tion, it recognized that the patent rights held by Abbott changed the evaluation.' 6
The patent grant involves the right to exclude, which can lead to lawful agreements
allocating the market geographically or by customer type.0 7 Because the district
court focused on this market allocation as a basis of its finding of per se illegality,
the Eleventh Circuit was forced to reverse.' Not only did the court reject a per se
rule, but it also refused to apply a rule of reason analysis to the agreements.' 9 In
doing so, the court pointed out that rule of reason analysis would be inappropriate,
as well, because "the anticompetitive effects of exclusion cannot be seriously de-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1311.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1305.
104. Id. at 1306.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1304.
107. Id. at 1305.
108. Id. at 1304; see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 249
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
109. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311.
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bated.""... Thus, the Eleventh Circuit seemed to reject any traditional antitrust anal-
ysis of these settlements.
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case, providing guidelines to the dis-
trict court for analyzing the potential anticompetitive effects of the agreements."'
The court described a threshold analysis that must take place before any specific
antitrust inquiry." 2 If it is determined that terms of the agreements have effects
"beyond the exclusionary effects of Abbott's patent," these terms "may then be sub-
ject to traditional antitrust analysis to assess their probable anticompetitive effects
in order to determine whether those provisions violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.."
The court pointed to a number of factors influencing its reasoning. First, the
court emphasized the competing regimes of patent and antitrust law."4 Second, the
fact that the '207 patent subsequently was found to be invalid was not dispositive. " '
Third, in direct opposition to the Sixth Circuit, the mere existence or substantial
size of a "reverse payment" was insufficient to trigger per se illegality, especially
where the lack of any damages reduces the risk for the generic manufacturers in the
infringement suit."6 The Eleventh Circuit seems to be in agreement with the Sixth
Circuit that these agreements have some anticompetitive effects, but traces them to
the exclusionary power of the patent, which shelters them from antitrust liability.
2. The Eleventh Circuit's Schering-Plough Decision: Rejection of the FTC's
Standard Prohibiting Reverse Payments in Exchange for Delayed Entry
The Eleventh Circuit clarified its reasoning in the subsequent decision of Schering-
Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,"7 a case in which the FTC also articu-
lated its own standard. In this case, the FTC challenged the settlements between
patent holder Schering-Plough and two generic manufacturers, ESI Lederle, Inc.
and Upsher Laboratories under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the
FTC Act." 8 The agreement between Schering and Upsher settled their patent in-
fringement suit just before trial and included a licensing deal, whereby Schering
obtained an exclusive license from Upsher to market Niacor." 9 Specifically, Scher-
ing agreed to pay Upsher $60 million in "initial royalty fees," $10 million more in
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1312.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1306 ("As one court has concluded, 'when patents are involved ... the exclusionary effect of the
patent must be considered before making any determination as to whether the alleged restraint is per se ille-
gal.'" (citation omitted)).
115. Id. at 1308.
116. Id. at 1309-10; see also Daniel A. Crane, Ease over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 698, 703-04 (2004) (emphasizing asymmetries of risk in HWA litigations).
117. 402 F.3d 1056 (l1th Cir. 2005).
118. Id. at 1061.
119. Id. at 1059-60.
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milestone royalty payments, and a further $10-15 million royalties on sales.' The
parties also agreed that Upsher could enter its generic onto the market beginning
September 1, 2001, more than five years before Schering's patent was to expire. 2'
ESI also submitted an ANDA filing with a Paragraph IV certification in Decem-
ber 1995.122 Schering duly filed a patent infringement suit against ESI.121 Schering
and ESI ultimately agreed to the following settlement terms: (1) ESI could enter the
market on January 1, 2004-almost three years ahead of the patent's expiration
date; (2) Schering would pay $5 million to ESI for legal fees; and (3) Schering
potentially would make a $10 million payment to ESI, if the FDA approved ESI's
generic within a certain period of time. 24
In 2001, the FTC brought an administrative complaint against all three compa-
nies. "'25 Using a full rule of reason analysis, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
found both agreements to be lawful patent settlements. 26 In particular, the ALJ
found that the patent's exclusionary power outweighed the FTC's argument that,
absent the reverse payment settlement, the generics could have entered the market
earlier. 2
On appeal to the full Commission, the ALJ's decision was reversed under a trun-
cated rule of reason analysis.'28 The Commission announced its standard prohibit-
ing any settlement in which a reverse payment is made in exchange for delayed
market entry. 29 In Schering's case, the Commission determined that the reverse
payments far exceeded actual consideration for the licenses received.' 0 The Com-
mission would allow for agreements on entry date without reverse payments or
with payments limited to litigation costs not to exceed $2 million.'
The defendants appealed the Commission's decision, wisely bringing its appeal
in the Eleventh Circuit. 3 2 The Eleventh Circuit reversed and clarified its Valley
Drug holding into a three part test: "the proper analysis of antitrust liability re-
quires an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent;
(2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting
anticompetitive effects."'33 Applying that test to the Schering agreements, the Elev-
120. Id. at 1060.
121. Id. at 1058-59.
122. Id. at 1060.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1060-61.
125. Id. at 1061.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1061-62.
128. Id. at 1062.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1066.
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enth Circuit found them well within the scope of the patent and thus legal patent
settlements."3'
C. The Second Circuit's Tamoxifen Decision: The Supreme Court's Missed
Opportunity
The Second Circuit has provided the most recent appellate decision on pharmaceu-
tical patent settlements in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.'35 In this case,
Zeneca, Inc.'36 held the patent rights to and manufactured tamoxifen citrate, a lead-
ing breast cancer drug.'37 Barr Laboratories, Inc. filed a Paragraph IV certification
in an attempt to bring a generic version of tamoxifen to market.'38 Zeneca brought
a patent infringement suit in 1987 ("Tamoxifen r'),3 9 which it subsequently lost in
1989, ' and which was on appeal in 1993 when the two companies signed a settle-
ment agreement. 4'
The agreement's principal terms resemble those of the agreements discussed
above. Barr agreed not to market its generic version of tamoxifen until Zeneca's
patent expired in 2002 and thus amended its ANDA to a Paragraph III certifica-
tion. 4 2 In exchange, Zeneca agreed to pay Barr $21 million plus an additional $45
million over ten years to Barr's raw material supplier.'43 Barr also received a non-
exclusive license to sell tamoxifen tablets manufactured by Zeneca under Barr's own
label.' Furthermore, the two companies agreed that Barr would be permitted to
revert to Paragraph IV certification, if a second generic manufacturer successfully
challenged the tamoxifen patent as invalid or unenforceable "in a final and unap-
pealable judgment."'15
Finally, the two parties also moved the Federal Circuit to dismiss Zeneca's appeal
as moot and obtained a vacatur of the district court's Tamoxifen I judgment.'46 This
action was significant for Zeneca because its patent was further challenged by three
ANDA filers, who were all unsuccessful in their attempts to rely on the vacated
Tamoxifen I decision.'47 Meanwhile, the "successful defense" rule was held to be
134. Id. at 1068.
135. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom., Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007).
136. Id. at 190. The defendants were Zeneca, Inc., AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and AstraZeneca PLC.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 193.
139. Id.
140. Id. The patent was declared invalid. See Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., Inc., 126 F.R.D. 467,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
141. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193-94.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 193.
146. Id. at 194. Such a vacatur was subsequently held to be invalid. Id. (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v.
Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27-29 (1994)).
147. Id. at 195.
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invalid, and Barr then became eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period, which
would only be triggered by Barr marketing its own generic version of tamoxifen 46
After further proceedings, Zeneca's patent was upheld against all generic challeng-
ers, 49 and no generic marketing of tamoxifen occurred until after the expiration of
the patent in 2002.15° The private antitrust plaintiffs challenged three aspects of this
settlement agreement: (1) that it was made after the finding of invalidity in the
Tamoxifen I decision; (2) that it involved a reverse payment; and (3) that the reverse
payments were excessive.' 5 '
The Second Circuit upheld the agreement and affirmed the district court.' Two
factors were central to the court's decision. First, the court noted that the plaintiffs'
arguments rested heavily on the contention that the Federal Circuit would have
affirmed the invalidity of Zeneca's patent.'53 This contention was too uncertain for
the court, as evidenced by the subsequent success enjoyed by Zeneca in the later
infringement suits. Second, the court held that the mere existence of a reverse pay-
ment, especially in the context of HWA, is not enough to trigger per se unlawful-
ness." 4  While the court acknowledged that a reverse payment seemed"suspicious," '55 it viewed the settlement as an attempt by a patent holder to protect
its lawful monopoly, which must be presumed valid.'56 In this sense, the settlement
did not exceed the scope of the patent. 7 The Second Circuit acknowledged falling
in line with the Eleventh Circuit on the importance of analyzing the scope of the
patent.'58 If an agreement does not exceed the patent scope, it will be valid unless
the patent infringement suit is itself baseless.5 9
Dissatisfied with this ruling, the FTC petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of
certiorari. 6 In an interesting move, the Supreme Court requested an amicus brief
from the Solicitor General's office. As it did in the Schering-Plough case, the Solici-
tor General broke ranks with the FTC and recommended denial of certiorari.' 6'
Ultimately, the Solicitor General's view prevailed with the Supreme Court.'62
148. Id. at 195-96.
149. Id. at 196.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 198.
152. Id. at 197.
153. Id. at 203-04. Indeed, the court noted that Zeneca later won lawsuits enforcing the tamoxifen patent.
Id.
154. Id. at 206. The plaintiffs themselves did not argue for a standard of per se illegality, as had been
adopted by the Sixth Circuit. Id.
155. Id. at 208.
156. Id. at 208-09.
157. Id. at 209 n.22.
158. Id. at 212.
159. Id. at 213.
160. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tamoxifen, 127 S. Ct. 3001 (No. 06-830), 2006 WL 3694387.
161. Id.
162. Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007).
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D. The Congressional Response: Senate Bill 316: The Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics Act
In January 2007, Senator Kohl, along with other members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, introduced Senate Bill 316 entitled the "Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics Act." 63 The bill's principal thrust is to prohibit "reverse payments" that
accompany delays of entry by the generic manufacturer. Specifically, the bill would
amend the Clayton Act to prohibit an agreement in conjunction with a patent
infringement claim in which: "(1) an ANDA filer receives anything of value; and (2)
the ANDA filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell the
ANDA product for any period of time."' ' The bill explicitly allows for the patent
holder to permit the ANDA filer to enter the market early, but that must be the
limit of value given.15 A violation of this provision will result in a forfeiture of the
180-day exclusivity period."' Though this bill stalled in committee, it likely will
resurface in some form in the future.
V. THE BEST SOLUTION IS A TWO-STEP STANDARD INCORPORATING
PATENT RIGHTS INTO THE RULE OF REASON
A. Proposed Two-Step Standard
The variety of solutions proposed reveals the difficulty in resolving the problem
posed by pharmaceutical patent settlements under the Hatch-Waxman regulatory
provisions. Given the intricacy of the competing interests among the patent regime,
antitrust laws, and the regulatory framework provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act,
this variety comes as no surprise. The best solution is one that addresses all these
interests, while providing patent and generic drug manufacturers the direction and
predictability to craft flexible solutions to complex business issues. Consequently,
the ideal standard to use when evaluating these settlements has two steps. First, the
court should compare the exclusionary scope of the patent and the settlement
terms. Second, the court should perform a traditional rule of reason treatment that
takes into account the first step's findings.
The Supreme Court stands in the best position to effect these proposed changes.
Had it granted certiorari in Tamoxifen, the Court could have installed a new stan-
dard, thereby providing drug manufacturers with the clearest parameters for future
settlements. This issue will not disappear, and the Court may yet weigh in on these
settlements. For the moment, the Eleventh Circuit's standard likely will become the
prevailing test for all pharmaceutical settlements. Because appeals from an FTC
decision may be made to any circuit court of appeals, antitrust defendants certainly
163. Sen. Kohl was joined by Senators Leahy, Grassley, Feingold, and Schumer. The Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act, S. 316., 110th Congress, (2007).
164. S. 316 § 3.
165. Id. § 3(b).
166. Id. § 5.
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will choose the favorable decisions of the Eleventh Circuit, over the per se rule of
the Sixth Circuit or the uncertainty of a circuit that has yet to rule on this issue.'67
While the Eleventh Circuit standard articulated in Valley Drug comes closest to the
standard proposed here, it does not explicitly provide for defendants to demon-
strate procompetitive justifications for any anticompetitive effects demonstrated by
the plaintiffs.
B. The Advantages of the Proposed Two-Step Standard
The two-step standard is advantageous for three reasons. First, it provides pharma-
ceutical companies with the most flexibility to craft settlements to costly and un-
predictable litigation. Second, it strikes a proper balance between patent and
antitrust considerations. Finally, it will provide sufficient antitrust oversight to pro-
tect consumers from anticompetitive sham settlements. The two-step standard ac-
complishes all this while avoiding the pitfalls inherent in the solutions proposed by
the Sixth Circuit, FTC, and Congress.
1. The Two-step Standard Avoids the Pitfalls of the Sixth Circuit's Per Se Rule
The Sixth Circuit's per se rule is simply too narrow and limits the options available
to parties in patent settlement negotiations. The Sixth Circuit likened the agree-
ment in Cardizem to a "horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the mar-
ket for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per
se illegal restraint of trade." 6 ' This depiction of the agreement fails to take into
account HMR's patent rights, which are designed to permit patent holders to profit
from that type of market allocation through licensing agreements.
The Sixth Circuit also fails to give sufficient weight to the fact that the generic
manufacturer in Cardizem entered the market before the expiration of the patent
term.'69 To follow the Sixth Circuit's reasoning would seem to require patent hold-
ers to pursue every patent infringement claim against an ANDA filer to its final
judicial conclusion. In such a situation, both parties would assume large litigation
costs, but the generic manufacturer would face no risk beyond these costs. If the
generic manufacturer loses the infringement case, there will be no actual damages
available to the patent holder because the generic has not yet marketed its drug.
On the other hand, if the generic manufacturer wins the infringement case, it
reaps huge rewards that border on windfall. First, it will enter the market immedi-
ately, or upon forthcoming FDA approval, and take a significant portion of the
market share in the duopoly situation granted by the 180-day exclusivity period. It
cannot be denied that this result is good for consumers, who likely will see de-
167. Private plaintiffs still can bring suit in district courts of other circuits.
168. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003), cert denied sub norn., Andrx
Pharms., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
169. Id.
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creased prices even in the duopoly situation-and certainly after the 180-day exclu-
sivity period expires and other generics enter the market. Nevertheless, the
generic's ability to act as a proxy for the consumer with zero risk beyond litigation
costs gives them too much bargaining power over the patent holder. Even a strong
patent must bear some risk of losing in a patent infringement suit, and a wise
company would be willing to pay a reasonable settlement fee to ensure that a patent
suit is not lost. Under the Sixth Circuit's per se rule, patent holders are barred from
this choice. Such a standard would not give due weight to the policy of innovation
underlying the exclusive nature of the patent laws and at the heart of Hatch-Wax-
man Act itself.
2. The Two-step Standard Avoids the Pitfalls of the FTC's Standard
The FTC's standard attempts to ameliorate the strictness of the per se standard by
permitting reverse payments up to $2 million to the generic for litigation costs. The
FTC believes that this will not discourage settlements because drug manufacturers
still will be free to settle on an entry date before the expiration of the patent. 7 '
Given that delayed entry is the principal danger that the FTC wishes to avoid, it
seems anomalous to permit settlements that provide for delayed entry without re-
verse payments. Under Hatch-Waxman, a generic manufacturer has sufficient bar-
gaining power to negotiate entry into the market before the expiration of the patent
in addition to payments of millions of dollars. Absent those payments, the generic
manufacturer will surely have enough bargaining power to negotiate for an even
earlier entry into the market. If the settlement provided anything but an immediate
entry date, the FTC would permit the settlement, despite the same anticompetitive
effects of a "pay for delay" settlement.
Furthermore, the FTC's championing of the truncated rule of reason will not
provide the flexibility pharmaceutical manufacturers need to navigate Hatch-Wax-
man's complex regulatory scheme. The truncated rule of reason permits plaintiffs
to establish a prima facie case without demonstrating any actual adverse effects in a
defined relevant market.'71 In practice, this low threshold means that the burden
shifts almost immediately to the defendants to justify the settlement terms with
procompetitive effects.' As a result, this standard begins to look like a standard of
presumptive invalidity, differing from the Sixth Circuit's standard of per se illegal-
ity only to the extent of permitting procompetitive justifications.
The two-step standard would take better account of the patent regime that en-
courages innovation at the expense of short-term competition. Because pharma-
ceutical patent settlements take place at the intersection of patent law, antitrust law
and a rigorous regulatory framework, the onus needs to be on the antitrust plain-
170. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (1lth Cir. 2005).
171. See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1911 (2d ed. 2005).
172. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065.
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tiffs to establish the anticompetitive nature of the proposed or actual settlement.
This can be done only by addressing the nature of the patent grant. Consumers still
would be protected from settlements like the one in Cardizem, in which Andrx
agreed to delay marketing any generic version of cardizem in the United States, not
merely one that infringed HMR's patent.'73
Though less stringent than the per se rule, the two-step standard is not a stan-
dard of presumptive validity. If the plaintiff is successful in demonstrating anticom-
petitive effects or if the settlement terms exceed the scope of the patent, the burden
will shift to the defendant manufacturers to show the pro-competitive justifications
or corresponding efficiencies. This is a difficult burden for the defendants. Even if
the defendants are successful in meeting the burden, the plaintiff has a final oppor-
tunity to show that "alternative means" are available to achieve the same desired
procompetitive effects.'
3. The Two-step Standard Avoids the Pitfalls of the Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics Act
Congress should not seek to impose its will on an uncertain and developing area of
law for a number of reasons. First, the courts always have been the traditional
forum for the development of antitrust doctrine.' Second, the two-step test has
the added advantage of being a legal standard with which district courts are gener-
ally familiar based on other patent and antitrust doctrines. Third, the congressional
remedy would still permit delayed entry, even when accompanied by reverse pay-
ments. The only proposed sanction for such "pay for delay" settlements under the
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act is forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity
period. This seems to offer little help to consumers, while stifling the creativity of
pharmaceutical manufacturers in devising unique solutions to the complexities of
Hatch-Waxman. Like the inadequate solutions proposed by the FTC and the Sixth
Circuit, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act also fails to consider the
value of the patent holder's lawful exclusionary rights.
173. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902; see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
174. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 n.14 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub
nor., Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007).
175. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911) ("The merely generic enumeration
which the statute makes of the acts to which it refers, and the absence of any definition of restraint of trade as
used in the statute, leaves room for but one conclusion, which is, that it was expressly designed not to unduly
limit the application of the act by precise definition, but, while clearly fixing a standard, that is, by defining the
ulterior boundaries which could not be transgressed with impunity, to leave it to be determined by the light of
reason, guided by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the
statute, in every given case whether any particular act or contract was within the contemplation of the
statute.").
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The Hatch-Waxman Amendments have complicated an already difficult and con-
tentious area of law. Nevertheless, the district and appellate courts have begun to
develop and articulate the parameters of this complex issue. Given the Supreme
Court's reluctance to hear this issue, it is up to the lower courts to develop new
standards. A clear and predictable rule such as the two-step standard proposed in
this Comment would provide manufacturers and antitrust regulators the predict-
ability and flexibility to protect consumers without sacrificing innovation or in-
creasing costly litigation.
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